

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JAMES B. BUSEY, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATOR, BEFORE THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON AVIATION SECURITY AND TERRORISM. APRIL 4, 1990.

Madam Chairman and Members of the Commission:

I welcome the opportunity to appear before the Commission this afternoon. With me are two FAA officials with whom you are familiar and in whom Secretary Skinner and I have great confidence: Monte Belger, Associate Administrator for Aviation Standards, and Ray Salazar, Director of Civil Aviation Security. I will be brief in my comments.

At the outset, I want to express my sorrow over the Pan Am 103 bombing along with my personal sense of indignation and outrage over that senseless tragedy. I can assure you that I am committed to doing all that we can to the best of our abilities to prevent another such occurrence. I take my security responsibilities very seriously. Those responsibilities, contained in the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, are substantial. The Anti-Hijacking Act of 1974, for example, mandated that the FAA Administrator screen passengers and carry-on baggage, provided authority for the Administrator to oversee law enforcement efforts associated with hijacked aircraft in flight, and called on the Administrator to take such additional actions as necessary to deter hijackings and criminal acts against civil aviation. The primary thrust of the legislation and the FAA's initial efforts at compliance, of course, were directed at stemming hijackings; more recently, the

exercise of this authority has focused much more heavily on means of thwarting the terrorist threat. Civil aviation remains a target of choice to terrorists, and it is clear that as a nation we have a long ways to go to fully counteract that threat to our air transportation system.

FAA has made solid progress in strengthening our Nation's civil aviation security programs over the past several years. We have made a substantial commitment of resources to develop explosives detection systems and to improve existing screening systems. New procedures have been developed, and air carrier and airport operator compliance more carefully monitored by FAA inspectors. Coordination of security information between U.S. intelligence and law enforcement agencies and the FAA has improved, as has our system for distributing that information to affected organizations in the aviation community. New regulatory requirements have been formulated and applied in those locations where the threat is greatest. And substantial efforts have been made to give full effect to the 1985 law calling for the FAA to inspect the adequacy of security at airports overseas.

While I am pleased that progress has been made, I am not satisfied. None of us should be. Much remains to be done to better come to grips with one of the more vexing problems of our time. I fully recognize that fact, and you have my assurance that

I and my staff are doing all we can to address this problem with timely, reasonable, and effective solutions.

I see the continued need to press forward with an aggressive R&D program. For Fiscal Year 1991, we are requesting \$26.4 million for security-related R&D. We need to do more to develop new explosives detection systems and to improve the capability of our passenger and baggage screening systems, and we are taking steps in these areas. Also, the project we have underway at Baltimore-Washington International--using a systems approach to security--should provide us a lot of good data by tying together all the elements of a model security program into one system at one location where it can be readily assessed by security experts. We need and will continue to push for technological advances in the security area to complement improvements in procedures and staffing.

This Fiscal Year, our security staff will grow by 120 positions. For Fiscal Year 1991, we are seeking an additional 164 positions. We cannot deal with all the challenges that confront us without additional staff support. Some of our new personnel will assist us in dealing with security issues overseas in Europe and the Middle East; others will enable us to do a better job of formulating policy and overseeing a national program; still others will add to our front-line forces who perform the day-to-day inspections of airports and air carriers in the United States.

I am continuing to press for the operational deployment of the six TNA systems we have purchased. I am aware of the concerns of some of the Members of this Commission about the maturity of the TNA system, about whether it's been tested enough. In a perfect world with unlimited time, would we go slower? Sure. But, at the very least, we can all agree that the world is not perfect and we do not have unlimited time--the terrorist threat is with us today. It is not tomorrow's problem.

TNA is not perfect; it is not the ultimate answer; but it is the best that we and the American traveling public have going for us. As a public servant, I feel a deep sense of personal responsibility for assuring that the public has the best level of protection we can provide for it today, instead of waiting for an undeterminable period of time for something--such as fast neutron scattering technology--that might prove better. Having said that, though, I would like to make it clear that I see the need to encourage the development of additional technologies in the explosives detection area, and the FAA will remain the catalyst for that effort.

Before closing, Madam Chairwoman, I want to thank you and the other Commissioners for your work. I await your opinions and recommendations concerning what we in the FAA can do to improve our security efforts. I welcome that constructive input and

appreciate your concerns for the safety of the traveling public. We in the FAA share those very same concerns; we live daily with the responsibility of dealing with the serious threat of terrorism.

That completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to questions you may have at this time.