

STATEMENT  
OF  
ADMIRAL JAMES S. GRACEY  
COMMANDANT, U. S. COAST GUARD  
BEFORE THE  
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

31 OCTOBER 1983

MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE, I AM ADMIRAL JAMES S. GRACEY, COMANDANT OF THE COAST GUARD. WITH ME TODAY IS REAR ADMIRAL RICHARD A. BAUMAN, COMMANDER OF THE FIRST COAST GUARD DISTRICT. IT IS A PLEASURE TO APPEAR BEFORE YOU TODAY TO REPORT ON THE COAST GUARD'S INVOLVEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL PROGRAMS, AND ON DRUG TRAFFICKING ACTIVITIES IN THE NEW ENGLAND REGION.

THE COAST GUARD IS A COMPLEX ORGANIZATION WHICH PERFORMS 14 OPERATIONAL MISSIONS AND 13 SUPPORT FUNCTIONS. WE HAVE A TOTAL OF 39,000 MILITARY AND 5,400 CIVILIAN EMPLOYEES. IN ORDER TO PURSUE OUR ENFORCEMENT OF LAWS AND TREATIES MISSION, AND TO IMPLEMENT OUR COORDINATED ZONE STRATEGY FOR DRUG INTERDICTION, 129 OF OUR VESSELS AND 116 OF OUR SHORE FACILITIES HAVE LAW ENFORCEMENT AS ONE OF THEIR ASSIGNED MISSIONS.

THE NEW ENGLAND AREA, WHICH FOR PURPOSES OF THESE HEARINGS WE HAVE DEFINED AS INCLUDING THE COASTAL AREAS OF THE STATES OF CONNECTICUT, RHODE ISLAND, MASSACHUSETTS, NEW HAMPSHIRE, AND MAINE, CONTAINS 18 OF THESE VESSELS AND 23 OF THESE SHORE FACILITIES. MOST OF THESE UNITS ARE UNDER THE COMMAND OF ADMIRAL BAUMAN, EXCEPT FOR TWO STATIONS AND FOUR VESSELS LOCATED IN CONNECTICUT AND RHODE ISLAND, WHICH ARE OPERATIONALLY CONTROLLED BY VICE ADMIRAL WAYNE CALDWELL, COMMANDER OF THE THIRD COAST GUARD DISTRICT AND THE ATLANTIC AREA, IN NEW YORK.

AS THE NATION'S PRIMARY SEABORNE LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY WE ARE HEAVILY ENGAGED IN NARCOTICS INTERDICTION. MOSTLY WE SEIZE MARIJUANA. THE NATIONAL NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE CONSUMERS COMMITTEE ESTIMATES THAT APPROXIMATELY 60 PERCENT OF ALL MARIJUANA SMUGGLED INTO THIS COUNTRY IS TRANSPORTED BY SEA. THE PRIMARY SOURCE IS COLOMBIA, WITH A SMALL PERCENTAGE SMUGGLED BY AIR FROM JAMAICA. SINCE IT IS BULKY AND HAS RELATIVELY LOW VALUE WHEN COMPARED TO OTHER ILLICIT SUBSTANCES, IT

IS DIFFICULT TO SMUGGLE IN COMMERCIAL QUANTITIES IN A MANNER SIMILAR TO OTHER DRUGS - ITS ABOUT AS DIFFICULT TO CONCEAL AS BALES OF HAY. FOR THESE REASONS, AS WELL AS THE GEOGRAPHY OF THE CARIBBEAN, THE MARITIME MODE OF TRANSPORTATION IS FAVORED FOR THE MAJORITY OF FOREIGN-PRODUCED MARIJUANA. WHILE THE PRIMARY CARGO OF SMUGGLING VESSELS IS MARIJUANA - IN QUANTITIES OF UP TO 50 TONS PER VESSEL - INTELLIGENCE ALSO INDICATES THAT MOST CARRY COMPANION CARGOS OF COCAINE AND/OR OTHER CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES.

MOST OF THE DRUG TRAFFICKING VESSELS WE ENCOUNTER DEPART FROM THE NORTH COAST OF COLOMBIA, AND PASS THROUGH ONE OF THE GEOGRAPHIC CHOKE POINTS IN THE CARIBBEAN WHILE ENROUTE THE U. S. WE DEFINE THESE VESSELS CARRYING LARGE QUANTITIES OF DRUGS FROM SOURCE COUNTRIES TO THE VICINITY OF THE U.S. AS MOTHERSHIPS. THEY ARE USUALLY TRAMP FREIGHTERS OR CONVERTED FISHING VESSELS REGISTERED IN PANAMA OR HONDURAS, AND CREWED BY COLOMBIAN NATIONALS. THEY CARRY THEIR CARGO TO THE VICINITY OF THE U.S. WHERE THEY ARE MET BY CONTACT BOATS - SMALLER, FASTER U.S. VESSELS THAT EACH RECEIVE A PORTION OF THE MOTHERSHIP'S CARGO FOR THE FINAL SMUGGLING EFFORT INTO THE U.S.

IN ORDER TO INTERDICT THESE SMUGGLING VESSELS, THE COAST GUARD HAS ADOPTED A COORDINATED ZONE STRATEGY, WHICH DIVIDES THE TYPICAL MARITIME SMUGGLING ROUTES INTO THREE DISTINCT AREAS. FIRST IS THE DEPARTURE ZONE WHERE DRUGS ARE GROWN, MANUFACTURED, OR RECEIVED AND STORED, AND WHERE CARGOES ARE CONSOLIDATED FOR SHIPMENT. BECAUSE OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY AND U.S. LAW, DIRECT ACTION BY U. S. AGENCIES AGAINST SMUGGLERS IN FOREIGN TERRITORY IS IMPOSSIBLE. THE FEDERAL DRUG STRATEGY ALSO INCLUDES SOME VERY IMPORTANT ELEMENTS TO BE UNDERTAKEN THROUGH THE POLITICAL COOPERATION OF SOURCE COUNTRIES, SO CONGENIAL AND COOPERATIVE RELATIONSHIPS ARE OF VITAL IMPORTANCE. COAST GUARD ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES

IN THE DEPARTURE ZONE ARE THEREFORE LIMITED - BUT IT'S AN EXCELLENT AREA TO GATHER INTELLIGENCE.

NEXT IS THE ARRIVAL ZONE - WHICH WE DEFINE AS INCLUDING U. S. OFFSHORE WATERS OUT TO THE RANGE LIMITS OF THE TYPICAL CONTACT BOAT. THIS IS NORMALLY NO MORE THAT ABOUT 150 - 200 MILES ON THE EAST COAST, BUT CAN BE UP TO 600 MILES OFF THE WEST COAST. THE LENGTH AND CHARACTER OF THE 11,000 - MILE U.S. COASTLINE MAKES ABSOLUTE CONTROL OF OUR MARITIME BORDERS IMPOSSIBLE. HOWEVER, IT IS DESIRABLE TO MOUNT SUFFICIENT LOCAL ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY TO FORCE TRANSFER OPERATIONS FROM MOTHERSHIPS TO CONTACT BOATS AS FAR FROM SHORE AS POSSIBLE, THUS INCREASING THE DISTANCE AND TIME OF THEIR RUN, AND THEREFORE INCREASING THEIR RISK OF DETECTION.

THE REGION BETWEEN THE DEPARTURE ZONE AND THE ARRIVAL ZONE WE CALL THE TRANSIT ZONE. SURFACE TRAFFIC PATTERNS THROUGH THIS ZONE FORM ALONG THE EASIEST AND LEAST COSTLY PATHS BETWEEN THE SOURCE AND THE DESTINATION. THE REMAINDER OF THE TRANSIT ZONE IS OPEN OCEAN - IMPRACTICAL TO COVER FOR INTERDICTION, AVAILABLE TO THE SMUGGLER FOR ADJUSTING HIS ROUTES, BUT DEFINITELY EXPOSED TO VARIOUS INTELLIGENCE GATHERING FORMS, BECAUSE THE NAVIGATION AND COORINATION PROBLEMS FOR THE SMUGGLER IN THE OPEN OCEAN ARE MORE COMPLEX.

WE CONCENTRATE MOST OF OUR INTERDICTION ACTIVITY IN THIS TRANSIT ZONE - IN THE CARIBBEAN CHOKE POINTS AND IN THE SEA LANES WE IDENTIFY AS FREQUENTLY USED SMUGGLING ROUTES. WE SEEK TO DETECT, INTERCEPT AND INTERDICT MOTHERSHIPS ON THE HIGH SEAS - BEFORE THEY CAN DISPERSE THEIR CARGO TO CONTACT BOATS. OUR EXPERIENCE HAS SHOWN THAT OUR CHANCES OF STOPPING A RELATIVELY SMALL NUMBER OF LARGE, SLOW MOTHER-

SHIPS IS GREATER THAN OUR CHANCES OF NABBING THE MORE NUMEROUS CONTACT BOATS. IT IS OBVIOUSLY MORE EFFICIENT SINCE SEIZING ONE MOTHERSHIP MAY REMOVE AS MUCH DRUGS FROM THE PIPELINE AS THE SEIZURE OF 10 OR 20 CONTACT BOATS. WE DON'T IGNORE THE CONTACT BOATS THOUGH - WE TAKE THEM WHENEVER WE HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY.

OUR COORDINATED ZONE STRATEGY DEPENDS HEAVILY UPON RECEIPT OF DATA FROM NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS AND AIRBORNE SURVEILLANCE. INFORMATION FROM THESE SOURCES DECREASES OUR UNCERTAINTY IN ASSIGNING PATROL AREAS TO OUR CUTTERS, AND PERMITS MORE EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT USE OF OUR LIMITED NUMBERS OF DEPLOYED RESOURCES. WE DEPEND ON DEA AND THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TO COLLECT THE INFORMATION WE NEED IN THE DEPARTURE ZONE, AND ON OUR OWN SOURCES, CUSTOMS, DEA, AND A HOST OF OTHER FEDERAL AND STATE AGENCIES FOR HELP IN THE TRANSIT AND ARRIVAL ZONES.

IN NOVEMBER OF 1981 WE BEGAN INCREASING OUR COOPERATIVE INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS, TARGETING THE MARITIME TRAFFICKERS IN THE CARIBBEAN SEA, GULF OF MEXICO AND WATERS OFF THE SOUTHEAST U. S. COAST. SINCE THEN, THESE ACTIVITIES HAVE LED TO 67 SEIZURES SOLELY ATTRIBUTABLE TO IMPROVED INTELLIGENCE. THESE 67 SEIZURES HAVE NETTED 1.4 MILLION POUNDS OF MARIJUANA, 728 POUNDS OF COCAINE, AND 465 ARRESTS. THE OPERATION IS ALSO PROVIDING ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES WITH CURRENT TRAFFICKING TRENDS, INFORMATION ON THE MANAGEMENT PROBLEMS EXPERIENCED BY THE MARITIME SMUGGLER AND INCIDENTAL INTELLIGENCE ASSOCIATED WITH THE OVERALL INTERNATIONAL DRUG TRAFFICKING PROBLEM. THE INFORMATION PRODUCED BY THESE EFFORTS HAS ALSO CONTRIBUTED SIGNIFICANTLY TO OUR OVERALL DEPLOYMENT PATTERNS FOR CUTTERS AND AIRCRAFT.

DURING CALENDAR YEAR 1982 THE COAST GUARD SEIZED 3.5 MILLION POUNDS OF MARIJUANA, 9 POUNDS OF COCAINE, 3,190 POUNDS OF THAI STICKS, AND 62,000 DOSES OF OTHER DANGEROUS DRUGS. TO DATE IN 1983 WE HAVE SEIZED 1.6 MILLION POUNDS OF MARIJUANA AND 46 POUNDS OF COCAINE. ADDITIONALLY IN 1982 THE COAST GUARD COOPERATED WITH OTHER AGENCIES IN THE SEIZURE OF AN ADDITIONAL 194,000 POUNDS OF MARIJUANA, 784 POUNDS OF COCAINE, AND 18 POUNDS OF HASHISH. IN 1983 TO DATE WE HAVE COOPERATED IN THE SEIZURE OF AN ADDITIONAL 45,000 POUNDS OF MARIJUANA AND 400 POUNDS OF COCAINE.

IN THE NEW ENGLAND AREA, WE SEIZED FOUR VESSELS AND 164,000 POUNDS OF MARIJUANA IN 1982, AND SIX VESSELS CARRYING 88,000 POUNDS OF MARIJUANA SO FAR IN 1983. I HAVE ATTACHED THREE CHARTLETS GIVING A MORE SPECIFIC BREAKDOWN OF OUR DRUG INTERDICTION ACTIVITIES IN THE NEW ENGLAND AREA AT THE END OF MY FORMAL STATEMENT.

THE AGGREGATE RESULT OF OUR INCREASING EFFORTS TO STOP THE FLOW OF DRUGS HAS BEEN TO RAISE THE PERCENTAGE OF NARCOTICS THAT WE INTERDICT. PRIOR TO 1982, WE ESTIMATED THAT WE WERE CATCHING ONLY ABOUT 15 PERCENT OF THE DRUGS BOUND FOR THE U.S. BY SEA. TODAY WE FEEL WE ARE SEIZING ABOUT TWICE THAT AMOUNT. HOWEVER, OUR EXPERIENCE INDICATES THAT CURRENT INTERDICTION RATES HAVE LITTLE EFFECT ON SHORT-TERM MARIJUANA SUPPLY AND PRICE BECAUSE:

- A. MANY ALTERNATIVE SUPPLY SOURCES AND ROUTES EXIST.
- B. A LONG TERM EFFORT IS REQUIRED TO OVERCOME STOCKPILES AND PIPELINE SUPPLY THAT MAY NEGATE SHORT-TERM INTERDICTION EFFORTS.
- C. CURRENT INTERDICTION RATES STILL ALLOW FOR A PROFITABLE BUSINESS.

INTERDICTION RATES ALONE DO NOT REPRESENT THE BEST INDICATOR OF AN EFFECTIVE PROGRAM AIMED AT LIMITING THE SUPPLY OF MARIJUANA IN OUR COUNTRY. MOREOVER, THE EFFECT OF THE COAST GUARD INTERDICTION PROGRAM CANNOT BE DETERMINED INDEPENDENTLY FROM OTHER AGENCY ACTIONS. IF THE COAST GUARD EFFORT WERE UNILATERALLY INCREASED, OTHER SOURCES AND

SUPPLY ROUTES WOULD BE UTILIZED TO A GREATER EXTENT SINCE THE THREAT OF INTERCEPTION IS LESS. THEREFORE THEY BECOME THE DRUG SMUGGLERS' PREFERRED OPTION. ON THE OTHER HAND, A UNIFORM INCREASE IN EFFORT ACROSS THE WHOLE SPECTRUM OF SOURCES AND ROUTES (INCLUDING DOMESTIC PRODUCTION) WOULD HAVE A MORE SIGNIFICANT IMPACT ON THE OVERALL SUPPLY OF MARIJUANA. THE CURRENT COAST GUARD EFFORT IS NOW NETTING ABOUT 30 PERCENT OF THE MARITIME SHIPMENTS. ALONG WITH THE EMPHASIS ON OTHER INTERDICTION MODES IT APPEARS TO BE FORCING SOURCE SHIFTS TO DOMESTIC PRODUCTION. TO ILLUSTRATE THIS PROBLEM, I SHOULD NOTE THAT ACCORDING TO THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION THE CULTIVATION OF MARIJUANA IN THE U. S. DOUBLED IN 1982 OVER 1981, AND MAJOR NEW FIELDS WERE BEING ESTABLISHED IN MEXICO. AS A SOURCE AND SUPPLY, COLOMBIA HAS DROPPED FROM ABOUT 75 PERCENT A FEW YEARS AGO TO PERHAPS ONLY 50 PERCENT.

RATHER THAN A SPECIFIC COAST GUARD INTERDICTION GOAL OF ANY GIVEN PERCENT, OUR LONG RANGE GOAL IS TO INCREASE OUR ENFORCEMENT CAPABILITIES TO THE LEVEL WHERE MARITIME SHIPMENTS CEASE BEING PROFITABLE WHATEVER THAT MAY TURN OUT TO BE. IF THIS IS DONE IN CONJUNCTION WITH INCREASED ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES TARGETED AT LAND AND AIR TRANSPORTATION MODES, WE ESTIMATE A SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN OUR CURRENT NATIONAL INTERDICTION CAPABILITY WILL OCCUR. IF DONE UNILATERALLY, A GREATER SEABORNE INTERDICTION CAPABILITY WOULD SIMPLY FORCE SMUGGLERS TO OTHER PRODUCT SOURCES AND TRANSPORTATION MODES.

THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THE LEVELS OF PRESSURE OUR AT-SEA INTERDICTION EFFORTS ARE APPLYING HAVE CAUSED DIVERSION OF DRUG TRAFFIC TO OTHER ROUTES. FOR EXAMPLE, COAST GUARD PATROLS IN THE ATLANTIC COAST AREA NORTH OF SOUTH CAROLINA EXPERIENCED A 169 PERCENT INCREASE IN VESSELS SEIZED (FROM 13 TO 22), A 452 PERCENT INCREASE IN MARIJUANA SEIZED (FROM 132,000 TO 595,000 POUNDS), AND A 252 PERCENT INCREASE IN

PERSONS ARRESTED (FROM 56 TO 141) BETWEEN CY81 AND CY82. THIS MAY WELL HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY SMUGGLERS' ATTEMPTS TO GO AROUND THE ENFORCEMENT EFFORT IN THE FLORIDA AREA.

THIS INCREASING TREND SEEMS TO HAVE STABILIZED SO FAR IN 1983. DURING THE PERIOD FROM JAN 1 TO OCT 1, 1983 THE COAST GUARD SEIZED 15 VESSELS, CONFISCATED 252,000 POUNDS OF MARIJUANA AND MADE 103 ARRESTS FOR DRUG SMUGGLING IN THE AREA.

IN SPITE OF OUR EVER - INCREASING EFFORTS, OUR NATIONWIDE SEIZURE STATISTICS HAVE FALLEN THIS YEAR. FROM JAN 1 TO OCT 1 1982, WE SEIZED 140 VESSELS AND CONFISCATED 2.8 MILLION POUNDS OF MARIJUANA. DURING THE SAME TIME FRAME THIS YEAR WE HAVE SEIZED 109 VESSELS AND 1.6 MILLION POUNDS OF MARIJUANA. THIS DECLINE IN RESULTS IN SPITE OF INCREASING EFFORT I ATTRIBUTE, AT LEAST IN PART, TO THE FOLLOWING REASONS

- THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF HAVING ADDITIONAL COAST GUARD RESOURCES DEVOTED TO LAW ENFORCEMENT. - THE POOR GROWING SEASON COLOMBIA EXPERIENCED IN 1982, WHICH RESULTED IN A SIGNIFICANT DECREASE IN THE MARIJUANA CROP.
- BETTER IN-COUNTRY ENFORCEMENT. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE COLOMBIAN NATIONAL POLICE DESTROYED A SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER PORTION OF THEIR DOMESTIC CROP IN 1982 THAN IN PREVIOUS YEARS.
- SHIFT IN SMUGGLING TACTICS FROM MOTHERSHIPS CARRYING HUGE QUANTITIES OF MARIJUANA IN PLAIN VIEW TO SHIPMENT OF SMALLER QUANTITIES IN HIDDEN COMPARTMENTS THAT ARE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO LOCATE.

- SOME SHIFTS TO USE OF AIR DELIVERY (AIR DROPS) WHERE SMUGGLERS FLY OVER OUR CARIBBEAN PATROL VESSELS, AND DROP THEIR CARGOES TO CONTACT BOATS WAITING OFF THE U.S. COAST OR LOITERING IN THE WESTERN BAHAMAS.

THERE ARE A NUMBER OF INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TAKING PLACE IN THIS HEMISPHERE INVOLVING THE U. S. COAST GUARD:

- THE INTER-AMERICAN MARITIME INTELLIGENCE NETWORK (IAMIN) IS IN OPERATION LINKING THE U. S. COAST GUARD WITH THE COAST GUARD OR NAVY OF THE BAHAMAS, COLOMBIA, DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, ECUADOR, HAITI, HONDURAS, MEXICO, PANAMA AND VENEZUELA.
- WE ARE PROVIDING ASSISTANCE TO THE LESSER ANTILLES IN ESTABLISHING A COMMUNICATION LINK BETWEEN THE MANY ISLAND NATIONS TO PROMOTE INTERISLAND COOPERATION FOR DRUG INTERDICTION, AMONG OTHER THINGS.
- IN NOVEMBER 1981 AN AGREEMENT WAS FORMALIZED BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE U. S. WHICH RESOLVED OUR PREVIOUS PROBLEMS CONCERNING THE HANDLING OF U.K.-FLAG VESSELS SUSPECTED OF DRUG SMUGGLING. UNDER THE TERMS OF THIS AGREEMENT THE COAST GUARD MAY BOARD IN THE GULF OF MEXICO, CARIBBEAN SEA AND UP TO 150 MILES OFF THE ATLANTIC COAST OF THE UNITED STATES, PRIVATE VESSELS FLYING THE BRITISH FLAG IF WE BELIEVE THE VESSEL HAS ON BOARD A CARGO OF ILLICIT DRUGS BOUND FOR THE U. S. IN VIOLATION OF U. S. LAWS. TO DATE THERE HAVE BEEN 11 VESSELS SEIZED UNDER THE TERMS OF THIS AGREEMENT. THESE CASES RESULTED IN THE CONFISCATION OF 273,950 POUNDS OF MARIJUANA AND THE ARREST OF 74 PERSONS. ON-GOING DISCUSSIONS WITH SEVERAL CENTRAL AND SOUTH AMERICAN COUNTRIES WILL, I HOPE, PRODUCE SIMILAR AGREEMENTS TO ENHANCE OUR OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS.

- IN OCTOBER 1981, AS A PART OF THE HAITIAN MIGRANT INTERDICTION OPERATION (HMIO), THE COAST GUARD BEGAN TO WORK WITH THE HAITIAN NAVY TO TRAIN CREWS, REPAIR VESSELS AND PROVIDE THE FUEL NECESSARY FOR THE HAITIAN NAVY TO TAKE AN ACTIVE ROLE IN RESOLVING OUR MUTUAL PROBLEMS OF DRUG TRAFFICKING AND ILLEGAL MIGRATION. THIS PROGRAM HAS GREATLY INCREASED THEIR ABILITY TO RESPOND TO THESE THREATS, AS A RECENT MAJOR "BUST" BY A HAITIAN NAVY VESSEL ILLUSTRATES. THIS MIGRANT INTERDICTION PROGRAM HAS HAD OTHER SALUTARY BENEFITS. FOR EXAMPLE, OUR HMIO CUTTERS HAVE SEIZED 15 DRUG SMUGGLING VESSELS CARRYING 233,767 POUNDS OF MARIJUANA DURING THE EXECUTION OF THEIR MIGRANT INTERDICTION DUTIES. THE MERE PRESENCE OF A CUTTER IN THE WINDWARD PASSAGE ON A FULL-TIME BASIS HAS DONE MUCH TO AID US IN DISRUPTING THE NARCOTICS TRAFFICK.

WE ARE NOT FIGHTING THE DRUG BATTLE ALONE. WITH SUPPORT FROM THE WHITE HOUSE, IN 1982 CONGRESS CLARIFIED THE CONDITIONS UNDER WHICH DOD CAN ASSIST IN LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS. THE ADDITION OF SECTION 905 TO THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT ESTABLISHED A NEW CHAPTER IN TITLE 10, UNITED STATES CODE, WHICH CLARIFIES AND AUTHORIZES MILITARY COOPERATION WITH CIVILIAN LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS. MORE SPECIFICALLY:

- DOD CAN:
  - o PROVIDE INFORMATION.
  - o LOAN EQUIPMENT.
  - o TRAIN LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS.
  - o ASSIGN DOD PERSONNEL TO OPERATE AND MAINTAIN EQUIPMENT.

- DOD CANNOT:

- o ENGAGE IN "HANDS ON" ENFORCEMENT (NO ARREST AUTHORITY).
- o ASSIST LAW ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS IF IT EFFECTS MILITARY PREPAREDNESS.

AS A RESULT, THE NAVY IS PROVIDING THE FOLLOWING ASSISTANCE:

- o DAILY AERIAL SURVEILLANCE IN THE CARIBBEAN AREA, UTILIZING P-3 AIRCRAFT IN CONJUNCTION WITH REGULAR TRAINING FLIGHTS. THIS INCLUDES FREQUENT P-3 SORTIES FROM NAVAL AIR STATION BRUNSWICK, MAINE, AND ABOUT 50 HOURS/MONTH OF E-2C TIME ALONG THE ATLANTIC COAST.
- o CARRYING COAST GUARD BOARDING TEAMS ON SELECTED SURFACE UNITS, FOR SPECIFIC DEPLOYMENTS.
- o ON OCCASION, PROVIDING TOWING/ESCORT FOR SEIZED VESSELS TO ALLOW CUTTERS TO REMAIN ON STATION.

NAVY OPERATIONAL INVOLVEMENT TO DATE HAS CONTRIBUTED TO THE SEIZURE OF 11 VESSELS, THE ARREST OF 115 PERSONS, AND THE INTERDICTION OF OVER 412,222 POUNDS OF MARIJUANA, PLUS OTHER DANGEROUS DRUGS SINCE MAY OF 1982.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE NATIONAL NARCOTICS BORDER INTERDICTION SYSTEM (NNBIS) AND ITS COMMENCEMENT OF OPERATIONS ON JUNE 17, 1983, HAS FURTHER EXPANDED OUR NEED FOR DOD ASSISTANCE. SPEAKING FOR THE THREE OUT OF SIX REGIONAL NNBIS COORDINATORS WHO ARE COAST GUARD OFFICERS, I CAN STATE THAT ASSISTANCE FROM ALL THE ARMED FORCES IS INCREASING AS A RESULT OF THE EFFORTS OF THE NNBIS COORDINATOR AND HIS STAFF.

IN MY JUDGEMENT IT IS TOO EARLY TO TELL IF OUR EFFORTS HAVE RAISED THE DETERRENCE AND INTERDICTION LEVEL TO THE POINT WHERE LONG TERM PATTERNS OF MARITIME DRUG SMUGGLING WILL CHANGE. HOWEVER, THERE IS LITTLE DOUBT THAT OUR EFFORTS ARE HAVING AN IMPACT. DRUG SMUGGLERS ARE BEING FORCED TO RESORT TO MORE DEVIOUS AND COMPLEX STRATEGIES, INCLUDING MUCH HIGHER PAY FOR THEIR CREWS AND USE OF SOPHISTICATED EQUIPMENT IN THEIR ATTEMPTS TO ELUDE US. AS WE CONTINUE OUR EFFORTS TO SEIZE SMUGGLING VESSELS, AND TO PROSECUTE MORE AND MORE OF THEIR CREWS, THE DETERRENT EFFECT OF OUR EFFORTS WILL SURELY INCREASE. THIS TREND MAY ALSO BE HELPED BY INCREASED INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND OUR GOVERNMENT'S INITIATIVES WITH OUR CARIBBEAN NEIGHBORS. IF MORE COUNTRIES JOIN TOGETHER IN MUTUAL COOPERATIVE ENFORCEMENT, THE DEMANDS ON COAST GUARD RESOURCES COULD WELL REDUCE. PERHAPS SOMEDAY MARITIME DRUG SMUGGLING WILL BECOME TOO RISKY TO BE PROFITABLE. I CERTAINLY HOPE SO!

THAT CONCLUDES MY PREPARED TESTIMONY, MR. CHAIRMAN I WILL BE HAPPY TO ANSWER ANY QUESTIONS YOU OR THE MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE MAY HAVE.




**U.S. COAST GUARD SEIZURES  
off the  
New England Coast  
1981**

<u>VESSEL NAME/NATIONALITY</u>	<u>MARIJUANA SEIZED(LBS.)</u>	<u>ARRESTS</u>
Al-Lado-de-Ultimo / U.S.	3,600	3
Last Chance / U.S.	4,200	0
Relentless / U.S.	12,000	3
Debbie / Stateless	Residue	4
*Miss Margie / U.S.	20,000	9
*Unapplied Times / U.S.	Residue	3
*Ona / Venezuelan	Residue	0
Tiger Rose / U.S.	<u>36,000</u>	<u>8</u>
<b>Totals</b>	<b>75,800</b>	<b>30</b>

\* Vessels seized in cooperation with another agency.

Total vessels seized by CG in 1981 146  
 Vessels seized by CG in N. England 8  
 % of vessels seized in New England 5.4

Total marijuana seized by CG in 1981 2,544,696  
 Marijuana seized by CG in N. England 75,800  
 % of Marijuana seized in New England 2.9






**U.S. COAST GUARD SEIZURES  
off the  
New England Coast  
1982**

<u>VESSEL NAME/NATIONALITY</u>	<u>MARIJUANA SEIZED(LBS)</u>	<u>ARRESTS</u>
Grimurkamban / Danish	119,500	11
Fiesta / U.K.	12,000	2
Nirvana / U.S.	23,200	3
Compass Rose / U.S.	<u>9,700</u>	<u>6</u>
<b>Totals</b>	<b>164,400</b>	<b>22</b>

Total vessels seized by CG in 1982 174  
 Vessels seized by CG in N. England 4  
 % of vessels seized in New England 2.2

Total marijuana seized by CG in 1982 3,471,005  
 Marijuana seized by CG in N. England 164,400  
 % of marijuana seized in New England 4.7





- C & S Smile
- Southern Star
- Snow White/Christiana
- Ocean Overture
- Tho

U.S. COAST GUARD SEIZURES  
 off the  
 New England Coast  
 1983  
 to  
 20 Oct 1983

<u>VESSEL NAME/NATIONALITY</u>	<u>MARIJUANA SEIZED (LBS)</u>	<u>ARRESTS</u>
C & S Smile / U.S.	40,000	5
Ocean Overture / U.K.	6,300	2
Southern Star / U.S.	30,000	20
*Snow White / U.S.	4,000	0
Christiana / U.S.	150	0
Tho / German	<u>7,800</u>	<u>3</u>
Totals	88,250	30

\* Vessel seized in cooperation with another agency

Total vessels seized by CG in 1983 116  
 Vessels seized by CG in N. England 6  
 % of vessels seized in New England 5.1

Total marijuana seized by CG in 1983 1,541,698  
 Marijuana seized by CG in N. England 88,250  
 % of marijuana seized in New England 5.7

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